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Intell Prod

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Intelligence Production Outline

1. The primary problem confronting the Central Intelligence Agency in accomplishing its mission is to:

a. Forecast foreign conditions which could threaten US security.

b. Estimate the manner and degree that situations arising from those conditions would menace US security.

c. Advise responsible policy making authorities in sufficient time for appropriate action to be taken.

2. For the purpose of solving this problem, B/WE presents its conception of a desirable intelligence production program in the form of a list of proposed studies applicable to each country within the area of the Branch's competence. The studies are intended, when complete, to show clearly:

a. What each country needs of the US in order to maintain conditions consistent with US security.

b. What the US needs of each country in order to facilitate the preservation of US security.

c. What damage each country, alone or in concert with others, could do to the US in peace or in war.

d. What assistance each country could render the US in peace or in war.

3. The list of proposed studies is divided into categories designed to disclose:

a. The importance of any given country in the attainment of over-all US objectives.

b. Specific US interests and objectives in that country.

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c. The hindrances to the realization of those objectives, and, from the foregoing three points.

d. The soundness of the objectives and the methods being employed for their achievement.

4. The list envisages a careful examination and appraisal of each country:

a. As a single unit.

b. As a unit in a geographical region.

c. As a unit in a global concept.

d. As a unit in a military, economic or ideological bloc.

5. The findings of such studies would facilitate the preparation of situation estimates by providing a more scientific approach to problems that heretofore have been viewed as isolated or fragmentary.

6. The above concept of an intelligence production plan has been strongly influenced by the firm B/WE conviction of:

a. The unsoundness of stressing prolonged special studies, at the expense of forecasts and current situation estimates, before a proper perspective has been gained by continued production of daily, weekly and monthly estimates.

b. The serious danger attending the "riding" of a particular thesis or policy, particularly when it is taken out of context or attempts to dictate US policy, instead of concentrating on the maintenance of an over-all and objective viewpoint.

7. Attention is invited to the absence of any attempt to allocate the production of the proposed studies. Caution should be exercised to avoid confusing this list of studies with basic information requirements, with analytical studies already being considered on an inter-departmental basis, or with periodic and individual estimates of current and future situations.

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8. Appended to the list of proposed studies are suggested specific titles for papers designed to furnish analyses and estimates on the economy of Spain. These titles are indicative of the type of study which the outline is intended to evoke.



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"LIST OF PROPOSED STUDIES ON COUNTRY X"

GENERAL CATEGORIES

- I General (internal and external factors of interest to the US among others).
- II Position of the country in relation to others within the same region (such as Western Europe, the Far East, etc.).
- III Actual and/or potential conflicts in interests, ideologies and policies with those of other countries (with particular reference to the US).
- IV Interest of the US - public and private - in the country (Economic, Religious, Sentimental, etc.).
- V Commercial importance of the country (with particular reference to the US).
- VI Strategic importance of the country (with particular reference to the US).
- VII Effects of instability (political, social and economic) upon other states (with particular reference to the US and USSR).
- VIII Assistance the country is rendering or could render to the US in war and peace.
- IX Damage the country is inflicting or could inflict upon the US in war and peace.

The foregoing nine categories of studies would make possible a sound estimate of the over-all importance of the country to the US in connection with US objectives:

- (a) By itself.
- (b) As part of a geographical region.
- (c) As part of a bloc (economic, ideological, military, etc.)
- (d) On a global or over-all basis.

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DETAILED OUTLINE OF PROPOSED STUDIES ON COUNTRY "X"

I General

A. Domestic political conditions

1. Stability of the government

- (a) Prospects of major changes in the government.
 - (i) Probable policies and objectives of prospective governments.
- (b) Problems confronting the government - political and economic.

2. Government policy on:

- (a) Civil rights
 - (i) Religious freedom.
 - (ii) Personal liberty.
 - (iii) Freedom of election.
 - (iv) Freedom of the press.
 - (v) Minority groups.
- (b) Education.
- (c) Powers of the state.

3. Political parties (including the Communists)

- (a) Organizational structure.
- (b) Leadership.
- (c) Policies.
- (d) Extent of influence.
- (e) Strength of the parties.
- (f) Attitude of the parties toward the government.
- (g) Splinter groups.
- (h) Foreign orientation of.

4. Communism (in addition to coverage indicated above under 3)

- (a) Relations with Moscow, the Cominform, and other Communist parties.
- (b) Communist influence on labor.
- (c) Strikes, disturbances, demonstrations, riots - Communist instigation of, and participation in
- (d) Party apparatus (clandestine)
- (e) Communist front organizations.

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- (f) Infiltration
 - (i) Government.
 - (ii) Political parties and groups.
 - (iii) Armed forces.
 - (iv) Police.

5. Other influential groups (political influence on the government and parties)

- (a) Labor.
- (b) Employer groups.
- (c) Religious organizations.
- (d) Other important organizations.

B. External affairs:

1. Relations with colonial or dependent areas.

- (a) Degree of dependence on such areas.
- (b) Policies.

2. Foreign relations with:

- (a) The US.
- (b) The USSR.
- (c) Neighbors (in same region).
- (d) The UN.
- (e) Others.

C. Economic affairs:

1. Government policy on

- (a) Agriculture, forestry and fishing.
- (b) Industry.
- (c) Labor
 - (i) Strikes.
 - (ii) Sabotage.
- (d) Foreign trade (including trade with colonies)
- (e) Finance.
- (f) Transportation.
- (g) Population problems.
- (h) Public utilities.
- (i) Wages.
- (j) Prices.
- (k) Profits.
- (l) Unemployment.
- (m) Mining.

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2. Domestic economic conditions

- (a) Agriculture, forestry and fishing.
- (b) Industry.
- (c) Labor
 - (i) Strikes.
 - (ii) Sabotage.
- (d) Foreign trade (including trade with colonies)
- (e) Finance.
- (f) Transportation.
- (g) Population problems.
- (h) Public utilities.
- (i) Wages.
- (j) Prices.
- (k) Profits.
- (l) Unemployment.
- (m) Mining.

D. Armed forces:

- 1. The national defense establishment.
- 2. The Army.
- 3. The Navy.
- 4. The Air Force.
- 5. Security forces and police.
- 6. Scientific research.

E. Psychological (morale) conditions (state of mind as distinct from official statements).

II Position of the country in relation to others within the same region (such as Western Europe, the Far East, etc.)

- A. Politically.
- B. Economically.
- C. Militarily.
- D. Ideologically.

III Actual and/or potential conflicts in interests, ideologies and policies - with:

- A. The US.
- B. Allies of the US.

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- C. The USSR.
- D. Allies of the USSR.
- E. The UN.
- F. Others.

IV Interest of the US in the country. (public and private)

- A. Political.
- B. Economic (in as much detail as possible).
- C. Military investment.
- D. Ideological.
- E. Religious (including, for instance, the interest of Roman Catholics in Rome).
- F. Sentimental (including, for instance, the interest of Irish-Americans in Ireland).
- G. Other.

V Commercial importance to the US.

- A. US purchases from in peace.
 - 1. Commodities
 - (a) Strategic raw materials (volume and value in dollars).
 - (b) Other commodities (volume and value in dollars).
 - (c) Importance to US economy.
 - 2. Services
 - (a) Types (Volume and value in dollars).
 - (b) Importance to US economy.
- B. US purchases necessary in war.
 - 1. Commodities
 - (a) Strategic raw materials (volume and value in dollars).
 - (b) Other commodities (volume and value in dollars).
 - (c) Importance to US economy.
 - (d) Preemptive buying.
 - 2. Services
 - (a) Types (volume and value in dollars).
 - (b) Importance to US economy.

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C. US sales and shipments to in peace.

1. Commodities

- (a) Strategic raw materials (volume and value in dollars).
- (b) Other commodities (volume and value in dollars).
- (c) Importance to US economy.

2. Services

- (a) Types (volume and value in dollars).
- (b) Importance to US economy.

D. US sales and shipments to necessary in war (in order to insure uninterrupted US procurement of goods and services and to insure necessary efficiency and cooperation of country "X").

1. Commodities

- (a) Strategic raw materials (volume and value in dollars).
- (b) Other commodities (volume and value in dollars).
- (c) Importance to US economy.

2. Services

- (a) Types (volume and value in dollars).
- (b) Importance to US economy.

VI Strategic importance:

A. To the US in relation to cardinal US policies.

1. National Defense - Prevention of aggression (including war plans).

- (a) Containment of the USSR.
 - (i) ERP.
 - (ii) Atlantic Pact.
 - (iii) Regional Pacts.
 - (iv) MAP.
 - (v) Gifts or loans.
- (b) Collective security.
 - (i) United Nations.
 - (ii) Pan Americanism.
 - (iii) Hemispheric Defense.
- (c) The Monroe Doctrine.
- (d) Self-determination of peoples.

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2. Peace Promotion.

- (a) Containment of the USSR.
 - (i) ERP.
 - (ii) Atlantic Pact.
 - (iii) Regional Pacts.
 - (iv) MAP.
 - (v) Gifts or loans.
- (b) Collective security.
 - (i) United Nations.
 - (ii) Pan Americanism.
 - (iii) Hemispheric defense.
- (c) The Monroe Doctrine.
- (d) Elimination of commercial restrictions.

3. Protection and promotion of US economic interests.

- B. To allies of the US.
- C. To the USSR.
- D. To allies of the USSR.
- E. To others.

VII Effects of instability (political, social and economic) upon:

- A. The US.
- B. Allies of the US.
- C. The USSR.
- D. Allies of the USSR.
- E. Others.

VIII Assistance the country is rendering or could render to the US in:

- A. War as an
 - 1. Ally.
 - 2. Non-belligerent.
- B. Peace.

IX Damage the country is inflicting or could inflict on the US in:

- A. War as

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1. An ally (possible liability).
 2. An enemy.
 3. An ally of an enemy.
 4. A non-belligerent.
- B. Peace.

The foregoing nine categories of studies will make possible a sound estimate of the over-all importance of the country to the US in connection with US objectives.

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- (c) As part of a bloc (economic, military, etc.)
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